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Recent Developments 
Pittman v. Atlantic Realty Co.: 
Court of Appeals of Maryland Rejects the "Sham Affidavit" Rule and Reinforces 
the Separate Functions of the Judge and Jury 
The Court of Appeals of Maryland held that an 
affidavit, submitted for the purpose 
of withstanding a motion for 
summary judgment, that conflicts 
with original deposition statements, 
should not automatically be 
rejected, as is the standard practice 
under the federal "sham affidavit" 
rule. Pittman v. Atlantic Realty 
Co., 359 Md. 513, 540, 754 A.2d 
1030 (2000). The court further held 
that a judge's following of the federal 
"sham affidavit" rule equates to a 
determination of the affiant's 
credibility, a decision that lies solely 
with the jury. !d. at 540, 7 54 A.2d at 
1045-44. 
In 1996, Shari Hall (''Petitioner'') 
brought an action on behalf ofher son, 
Terran, against Northern Brokerage 
Company and Atlantic Realty 
Company ("Respondents") in the 
Circuit Court for Baltimore City. 
Petitioner alleged that Respondents' 
lead paint violation at Lauretta Avenue 
("subject premises") resulted in Terran 
being exposed to lead paint and was 
a substantial cause of injuries. In lead 
paint causes of actions, a plaintiffhas 
the burden of proving that the 
defendant's conduct was a substantial 
factor in causing the injuries. 
Petitioner in this case produced expert 
testimony in order to prove the 
requisite causal connection. 
During a deposition, Petitioner 
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testified that she had seen paint 
chips at the subject premises and 
that she had seen her son ingest 
them. During discovery, Petitioner 
was also given an interrogatory 
seeking the addresses and dates of 
the places where she and Terran 
lived. Petitioner responded that they 
had lived at the subject premises 
from 1992 until1993 and at another 
location from 1993 to 1996. She 
also stated that there was a period, 
although undetermined, that Terran 
was at the subject premises from 
8:00a.m. to 4:00p.m. for purposes 
of day care. During a deposition, 
Petitioner gave a variety of 
responses as to the actual dates she 
resided on the subject premises. 
Her inconsistent statements 
ultimately resulted in the conclusion 
that she and Terran had lived there 
for a period of two to four months. 
Petitioner also testified during a 
deposition that she and Terran 
visited the subject premises 
frequently during the times she was 
not residing there. Construing the 
evidence most favorably to the 
opposing party, the judge hearing 
the motion concluded that the extent 
of Terran 's exposure to lead paint 
was twice a week before residing 
there and three to four times a week 
for up to three hours at a time after 
residing there. 
Petitioner's lead paint expert 
testified that due to the vague 
responses Petitioner gave during 
the depositions and the 
interrogatories, he could not say 
with medical probability that 
Terran 's interaction with the 
subject premises was a major 
contributor to the injuries. However, 
the expert did say that two months 
of exposure was an insufficient period 
to yield a substantial cause in Terran's 
injuries. 
Respondents moved for 
summary judgment based on 
Petitioner's expert's deposition 
which indicated that it would be 
difficult to render an opinion as to 
substantial causation. Respondents 
also cited the expert's opinion that 
such causation was unlikely if the 
basis was a two-month stay at the 
subject premises. Petitioner 
responded to the motion with three 
affidavits. Petitioner's affidavit 
contained statements indicating that 
she resided on the subject premises 
for five and a half months, a 
significantly greater period of time 
than that which was given during 
depositions and interrogatories. 
Based on this affidavit, Petitioner's 
expert opined that the alleged five and 
a half months of exposure could be a 
substantial factor in bringing about the 
harm. 
The respondents moved to 
strike the affidavits, claiming that they 
contradicted Hall's original 
deposition testimony as to the length 
of time she and Terran resided at 
the subject premises in addition to 
how frequently they visited. No 
explanation was given as to why the 
affidavits contained contradicting 
statements. 
The Circuit Court for Baltimore 
City granted both the motion to strike 
and summary judgment. The motions 
were granted due to the significant 
changes and contradictions in the 
testimony. The court felt that the 
discovery process would be 
subverted if a witness can 
dramatically alter testimony a year 
later. The petitioners appealed and 
the Court of Special Appeals of 
Maryland affirmed the circuit 
court's ruling. The court said that 
the inclusion of the new affidavits 
would constitute an unfair surprise. 
The court also adopted the "sham 
affidavit" rule, derived from federal 
caselaw. The petitioners appealed 
to the Court of Appeals ofMaryland. 
Petitioners argued that the 
court of special appeals erred, 
claiming issues of credibility under 
Maryland law are to be determined 
by the fact-finder, not the judge. !d. 
at526, 754A.2dat 1037. Petitioners 
also argued that they had a right to 
file the affidavits or, in the 
alternative, that the affidavits merely 
supplement and clarify prior 
discovery. !d. Respondents urged 
that the court accept the federal "sham 
affidavit" rule and conclude that the 
deposition testimony is inherently more 
reliable. !d. 
The court of appeals first noted 
that the caselaw interpreting the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
FRCP) 56 does not directly address 
he issue of an affidavit submitted 
in response to a motion for summary 
judgment that contradicts earlier 
deposition testimony. !d. at 527, 
754 A.2d at 1037. In Perrna 
Research & Development Co. v. 
Singer Co., the Second Circuit 
developed the "sham affidavit" 
rule, stating: 
[i]f an interested party has 
personal knowledge of the 
relevant facts, and if that 
party cannot explain a 
material contradiction 
between deposition 
testimony and a subsequent 
affidavit by the acquisition 
of newly acquired 
evidence, then the trial court 
may disregard the affidavit 
as a 'sham,' i.e. as one 
failing to 'raise any issue 
which [the trial court] can 
call genuine.' 
!d. at 529,754 A.2d at 1038 (citing 
410 F.2d 572 (2nd. Cir. 1969) ). The 
Perma court stated that a trial court 
may consider deposition testimony 
as more reliable than an affidavit 
because it is subject to cross-
examination. !d. The court also 
indicated that the contradictory 
affidavit may be disregarded to 
insure the utility of the summary 
judgment procedure (i.e. to screen 
out sham claims) and a party should 
not be allowed to produce a genuine 
issue of material fact based on 
inconsistent statements. !d. 
The Court of Appeals of 
Maryland first addressed the 
Respondents' contention that the 
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Petitioners violated the scheduling 
order and the discovery cutoff dates 
by filing supplemental affidavits 
beyond the court ordered deadline. 
!d. at 533-34, 754 A.2d at 1041. 
The court rejected this contention 
because the Maryland rules 
expressly authorize the filing of an 
affidavit in response to a motion for 
summary judgment. Id. at 534,754 
A.2d at 1041. This is separate from 
the discovery dates and the 
scheduling order. !d. 
The court then said that the 
federal "sham affidavit" rule was 
contrary to Maryland's interpretation 
of the summary judgment rule. !d. 
The federal rule requires the trial judge 
to make a credibility determination, 
finding support in the FRCP 56's 
phrase "genuine" issue of material fact. 
!d. In contrast, Maryland law has not 
viewed the function of a summary 
judgment motion as a proper vehicle 
for determining credibility. !d. at 
536, 754A.2dat 1042. All that the 
non-moving party needs to produce 
to prevent a summary judgment 
motion is evidence from which a 
reasonable jury could find for the 
non-moving party. !d. at 538, 754 
A.2d at 1043. However, if claims 
are so implausible or ridiculous, a 
judge may conclude that a rational 
juror could not reasonably find for 
the plaintiff. !d. 
In Pittman, the court found that 
a reasonable juror could believe the 
affidavits ofthe Petitioners. !d. at 
539, 754 A.2d at 1044. The court 
also said that there were other ways 
in which a court can deal with what 
they believe are "sham affidavits." !d. 
The Court of Appeals of Maryland 
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considered perjury charges 
and potential sanctions as an 
effective deterrent to 
individuals who may produce 
an inaccurate affidavit for the 
sole purpose of forestalling 
summary judgment. /d. at 
542-43, 754 A.2d at 1046. 
The court also advocated use 
of the "catch-all" power 
under Rule 2-504(b )(2)(G) 
which allows the court to 
order "any other matter 
pertinent to the management 
of the action." /d. at 543, 
754 A.2d at 1046. 
The court addressed the 
dissent's assertion that an analysis 
of internally contradictory trial 
testimony based on the holding in 
Kucharczyk v. State, 235 Md. 334, 
201 A.2d 683 (1964) should apply. 
/d. at 543-44, 754 A.2d at 1046-
4 7. The court said that Kucharczyk, 
which states that "testimony that is 
so contradictory that it lacked 
probative force ... [make it] 
... insufficient to support a finding 
beyond a reasonable doubt of the 
facts required to be proven," does 
not apply to every situation that 
involves testimony. /d. at 544, 754 
A.2d at 1046. The court stated that 
the analysis only applies when the 
contradiction goes to the core issues 
of the case or the criminal agency 
of the defendant. /d. at 545, 754 
A.2d at 1047. 
The effect of Pittman may be 
detrimental to the court's policy 
goals of judicial economy. It 
appears now that summary judgment 
motions may be easily defeated by 
conjuring up an alternative story. The 
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court indicates that the 
interests of justice will be 
better served by allowing the 
claim to go through, with the 
hope that the declarant will 
explain away the misunderstanding. 
Innocent parties will have to go 
through the expense, inconvenience 
and embarrassment of a lawsuit, 
when the factual basis does not 
really support one. Additionally, the 
role of discovery becomes less 
important when the opponent to 
summary judgment is permitted to 
bring forth supposed "facts" that 
completely surprise the moving 
party and ultimately leads to an 
unfair advantage. While the role of 
the ultimate fact-finder needs to be 
preserved, the court's interpretation 
of the particular roles in the judicial 
process is far too rigid. By rejecting 
the "sham affidavit" rule, the Court 
of Appeals of Maryland has opened 
the door for false testimony to be 
paraded in front of the jury, 
ultimately defeating any hope of 
judicial economy. 
